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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 14, Number 1, Fall 1975
Procedure Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code
Lenard L. Wolffe*
A series of recent decisions by appellate courts in Pennsylvania
has arisen involving the procedures available in zoning cases under
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) . This arti-
cle will detail those procedures, in light of the historical develop-
ment in the field of zoning, and offer practical suggestions for the
benefit of the practitioners, solicitors, local governing bodies, zoning
boards and planning boards which must function under these proce-
dures.
There are essentially eight ways to raise a zoning case in Pennsyl-
vania. Directly or indirectly, each is based upon statutory authority.
Consequently, every procedural problem in a zoning case is a matter
of statutory construction in the first instance. Six of the eight proce-
dural means of raising a zoning case involve the exhaustion of an
administrative remedy;2 two do not.3
*Universite de Fribourg, Switzerland; St. Andrews University, Scotland; A.B., George
Washington University (1948); J.D., George Washington University (1950); partner, Pechner,
Sacks, Dorfman, Wolffe, Moss & Rounick, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (1972).
2. Prior to the MPC, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy as the exclusive
means of determining zoning questions had become firmly ensconced in Pennsylvania law
and was virtually uniformly adhered to. See Jacobs v. Fetzer, 381 Pa. 262, 112 A.2d 356
(1955).
3. These two means of raising a zoning case, namely the right to a writ of mandamus
under certain limited circumstances and the right to bring suit to test the procedural regular-
ity of a zoning ordinance, avoid the administrative process.
The right to mandamus is a direct carryover from pre-MPC law. See Gallagher v. Building
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The eight ways to raise a zoning case are:
(1) By appeal, by any party aggrieved, from an administra-
tive decision to the zoning hearing board under the authority
contained in Sections 10909,1 10912,1 and 10913 of the MPC;7
Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
Under pre-MPC law, by reason of the authority contained in the codes of both second class
counties and first class townships, the right existed to test a zoning ordinance for its proce-
dural regularity by bringing a complaint in quarter sessions court within thirty days from the
passage of the ordinance. The matter now goes to the court of common pleas and the time
has been changed to thirty days from the effective date of the ordinance.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10909 (1972) provides:
The board shall hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that
the zoning officer has failed to follow prescribed procedures or has misinterpreted or
misapplied any provision of a valid ordinance or map or any valid rule or regulation
governing the action of the zoning officer. Nothing contained herein shall be construed
to deny to the appellant the right to proceed directly in court, where appropriate,
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P., sections 1091 to 1098 relating to mandamus.
Id. (footnote omitted).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (1972) provides:
The board shall hear requests for variances where it is alleged that the provisions of
the zoning ordinance inflict unnecessary hardship upon the applicant. Subject to the
provisions of section 801, the board may by rule prescribe the form of application and
may require preliminary application to the zoning officer. The board may grant a
variance provided the following findings are made where relevant in a given case:
(1) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregular-
ity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or
other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property, and that the unnecessary
hardship is due to such conditions, and not the circumstances or conditions generally
created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district in
which the property is located;
(2) That because of such physical circumstances or conditions, there is no possibility
that the property can be developed in strict conformity with the provisions of the
zoning ordinance and that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to
enable the reasonable use of the property;
(3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the appellant;
(4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood, or district in which the property is located, nor substantially or perma-
nently impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, nor be detri-
mental to the public welfare; and
(5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum variance that will
afford relief and will represent the least modification possible of the regulation in issue.
In granting any variance, the board may attach such reasonable conditions and
safeguards as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this act and the
zoning ordinance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10913 (1972) provides:
Where the governing body in the zoning ordinance, has stated special exceptions to
be granted or denied by the board pursuant to express standards and criteria, the board
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(2) By a landowner's "challenge" to the substantive validity
of a zoning ordinance or map, either with or without an adverse
administrative decision, brought before the zoning hearing
board under Section 10910;1
(3) By a non-landowner's "challenge" to the substantive va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance or map by reason of the authority
contained in Section 11005;1
shall hear and decide requests for such special exceptions in accordance with such
standards and criteria. In granting a special exception, the board may attach such
reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the ordinance,
as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this act and the zoning ordi-
nance.
7. Hereinafter, all references to section numbers are to those contained in the MPC.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972) provides:
The board shall hear challenges to the validity of a zoning ordinance or map except
as indicated in section 1003 and subsection (1) (b) of section 1004. In all such chal-
lenges, the board shall take evidence and make a record thereon as provided in section
908. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board shall decide all contested questions
and shall make findings on all relevant issues of fact which shall become part of the
record on appeal to the court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972) provides:
Persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land of another by an
ordinance or map or any provision thereof who desire to challenge its validity on
substantive grounds shall first submit their challenge to the zoning hearing board for
a report thereon under section 910.
The submission to the board shall be governed by the following:
(a) The aggrieved person shall submit a written request to the board that it hold a
hearing on the challenge. The request shall contain a short statement reasonably
informing the board of the matters that are in issue and the grounds for the challenge.
(b) The request shall be submitted within the time limitations prescribed by section
915. In order not to unreasonably delay the time when a landowner may secure assur-
ance that the ordinance or map under which he proposes to build is free from challenge,
and recognizing that the procedure for preliminary approval of his development may
be too cumbersome or may be unavailable, the landowner may advance the date from
which time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will run under section 915 by
the following procedure: (i) The landowner may submit plans and other materials
describing his proposed use or development to the zoning officer for a preliminary
opinion as to their compliance with the applicable ordinances and maps. Such plans
and other materials shall not be required to meet the standards prescribed for prelimi-
nary, tentative or final approval or for the issuance of a building permit so long as they
provide reasonable notice of the proposed use or development and a sufficient basis
for a preliminary opinion as to its compliance. (ii) If the zoning officer's preliminary
opinion is that the use or development complies with the ordinance or map, notice
thereof shall be published once each week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the municipality. Such notice shall include a general description
of the proposed use or development and its location, by some readily identifiable
directive, and the place and times where the plans and other materials may be exam-
ined by the public. The favorable preliminary opinion of the zoning officer shall be
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(4) By a landowner filing a "curative amendment" before the
local governing body" together with the appropriate documents
alleging the substantive invalidity of a zoning ordinance or
map and requesting a hearing under 8ections 10609.1" and
11004(1)(b);I2(5) By an appeal to the zoning hearing board from the grant
or denial of a planned unit development tentative or final ap-
proval;
(6) By an appeal from conventional subdivision actions (non-
planned residential development) under Sections 1050711 and
deemed to be a preliminary approval under section 915 and the time therein specified
for commencing a proceeding with the board shall run from the time when the second
notice thereof has been published.
(c) The board shall hold a hearing upon the aggrieved person's request pursuant to
section 910, commencing not later than sixty days after the request is filed. If a hearing
has been held by the governing body covering the same matters, at which a steno-
graphic record has been taken, the board shall upon motion of any party accept said
record as the record in the case before the board but the board shall not be precluded
from taking additional evidence, unless such evidence ought to be excluded under
section 908(6).
After submitting his challenge to the board, as provided in clauses (a) and (b), any
party aggrieved may take the same to court by appeal filed not later than thirty days
after notice of the report of the board is issued.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. E.g., borough councils, boards of supervisors, boards of commissioners.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.1 (1972) provides:
A landowner who desires to challenge on substantive grounds the validity of an
ordinance or map or any provision thereof, which prohibits or restricts the use or
development of land in which he has an interest may submit a curative amendment
to the governing body with a written request that his challenge and proposed
amendment be heard and decided as provided in section 1004. The governing body
shall commence a hearing thereon within sixty days of the request as provided in
section 1004. The curative amendment shall be referred to the planning agency or
agencies as provided in section 609 and notice of the hearing thereon shall be given as
provided in section 610 and in section 1004. The hearing shall be conducted in accord-
ance with subsections (4) to (8) of section 908 and all references therein to the zoning
hearing board shall, for purposes of this section be references to the governing body.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1)(b) (1972) provides:
(1) A landowner who, on substantive grounds, desires to challenge the validity of
an ordinance or map or any provision thereof which prohibits or restricts the use or
development of land in which he has an interest shall submit the challenge either:
(b) To the governing body together with a request for a curative amendment under
section 609.1.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10507 (1972).
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10508'1 either directly to the court of common pleas (at the
landowner's option) or to the zoning hearing board (non-
landowners may appeal in such situations only to the zoning
hearing board);
(7) By a writ of mandamus directed to the proper person or
body presumably after an adverse decision;
(8) By appeal directly to the court of common pleas within 30
days of the effective date of an ordinance alleging procedural
irregularity under Section 11003.11
I. THE PRE-MPC BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE
The MPC was designed to cure many of the problems that had
crept into land-use law not the least of which were those created by
procedural difficulties. The most seriously disadvantaged person
under the pre-MPC law was the landowner. For example, there was
no way to attack the substantive validity of either a zoning ordi-
nance or the mapping process which so restrictively zoned land as
to make it virtually unsalable. The common circumstance was to
zone in the most restrictive possible category so as to "freeze" the
land and thus allow the local governing body to pass on each pro-
posal on an ad hoc basis. In that situation, the landowner who
wanted to make a different use of his land required a special act of
rezoning. This was, of course, completely contrary to the concept of
rational planning. In addition, it gave rise to opportunities for favor-
itism and irrational decision making. Like it or not, most local gov-
erning bodies responded largely to the "head count" principle in
making their determinations. That is, they counted up the number
of people who were in favor of the rezoning application and the
number of people who were against it and decided the matter on
that basis. Other highly restrictive zones were created, such as mas-
sive industrial zones, for which there was no reasonable likelihood
of use in the foreseeable future.
In order to test the substantive validity of such zoning practices,
the landowner was required to present very finite plans (including
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508 (1972).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11003 (1972) provides:
Questions of an alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption of any ordi-
nance or map shall be raised by an appeal taken directly from the action of the
governing body to the court filed not later than thirty days from the effective date of
the ordinance or map.
1975
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final engineering and architectural plans), make an application, be
refused by the zoning administrative officer or building inspector,
take his appeal to the zoning board of adjustment and thence to
court. The cost of this was considerable, the likelihood of success
small, and definitive relief could only be achieved one parcel at a
time. Frequently, the municipality did not rezone the balance of the
tract, thus forcing the landowner to utilize the same procedure for
each parcel. The legal costs and the extensive amount of time in-
volved made such actions highly unprofitable and consequently
impractical. If the landowner elected to assault the entire scheme
of zoning and if he was successful, the likely result was that the
matter would be remanded until a new scheme of zoning was en-
acted. Usually the landowner who initiated the litigation was the
one least likely to be treated deferentially by the local authorities.
Thus, he was placed in a position of simply going through an aca-
demic exercise without definitive relief.
The MPC was designed to prevent such evils and to make it
possible for the landowner to successfully challenge zoning ordi-
nances and mapping so as to bring some rationality into the deci-
sion-making process. The MPC is totally geared to giving defini-
tive relief so that the landowner has a substantial opportunity to
recoup the cost and time involved in litigation by winning his case
and making his land that much more valuable. It also serves to give
the landowner some bargaining chips so that in the process of honest
negotiation, the local governing authorities cannot simply sit back
and ignore him. This is done by allowing the landowner to obtain
legal sanction for his plans in the event that his allegations of inva-
lidity are sound.
The contrast between Pennsylvania, which employs this concept,
and those states which do not have provisions for definitive relief is
profound. For example, in most states exclusionary zoning is pro-
hibited. Yet, very few landowners bring suit to have such ordinances
declared invalid. The reason is that a landowner may go through the
entire process and the courts may declare the ordinances and the
mapping unconstitutional. They will then order the local governing
authority to draft a new map and ordinance conforming to the
court's opinion. This leaves the landowner to the tender mercies of
the people he has just defeated in court. Obviously, they are not of
a mind, in most instances, to reward him or to accept his point of
view. Most frequently they will engage in what is known as "retribu-
tory zoning" and place the suing landowner in the same or even
Vol. 14: 1
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worse position than that in which he was before. In those states, and
in the exclusion suits in particular, the members of the local govern-
ing body will actually benefit by a court test since the matter will
drag on for several years, wasting valuable time. As a result of this
process, there is little if any effective control over local authorities
by the courts and little if any reason for local authorities to obey
court mandates.
One economic consequence of irrational and uneconomic zoning
practices is that of pushing the cost of land (and consequently hous-
ing) inexorably upward so that only the very wealthy can afford it.
The tendency toward large-lot zoning and the virtual dearth of land
zoned for middle and high densities have created a situation
whereby many suburban communities have no room for middle or
lower income groups. This is particularly true in the bedroom com-
munities which ring the large cities and has resulted in the term
"white noose." It is not, however, a racial matter at all, but one of
the economics of land-use. These economics are profoundly affected
by zoning practices, and these practices have been manipulated in
the past by the municipalities surrounding the cities to foster results
which conformed with the desires of the constituents of those com-
munities.
The MPC procedures and the Pennsylvania court cases constru-
ing such practices are designed to make it easier and considerably
less expensive to strike down such unconstitutional, invalid and
irrational zoning acts and ordinances. At the same time, the tradi-
tional zoning approach concerning the sanctity of use and bulk re-
strictions has been reinforced by the codification of the require-
ments for a variance. These requirements have been made some-
what more rigid so that the integrity of a rational, reasonably eco-
nomical, and realistic zoning plan has been strengthened consider-
ably under the MPC. Greater reliance can be placed upon existing
zoning restrictions by consumers and others if the entire scheme of
zoning meets the court tests. This is a significant advance.
II. THE TRADITIONAL CASES AND THE NEW PROCEDURE
In terms of the number of cases, the most common is the tradi-
tional zoning appeal from the refusal of a zoning administrative
officer or building inspector to issue a permit, involving an appeal
,to the zoning hearing board and thence to the court of common
pleas. This procedure has remained intact under the MPC. The
1975
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traditional duty of the board to hear disputed questions involving
the construction or application of dimensional requirements is now
contained in Section 10909.16 That too remains substantially as prior
to the MPC.
The term "unnecessary hardship" which gave the old zoning
boards of adjustment so much difficulty has been codified in the
MPC in Section 10912.17
The special exception cases which formerly vexed those who deal
with zoning questions are now codified in Section 10913.18 Clarity
has emerged in the special exception situation in that special excep-
tions are now what they were originally intended to be. Originally,
a special exception was a use or dimensional requirement which
could be had if certain very specific requirements were met. For
example, in an area zoned for single family dwellings on one acre
minimum tracts, a special exception could be had to reduce the one
acre to one-half acre if public water and sewage were available.
Under the MPC, the special exception now requires that fairly spe-
cific standards be met, which, if met, should result in the granting
of the special exception.
Cases presently brought under Sections 10909, 10912, and 10913
very closely follow the law prior to the MPC. Under the pre-MPC
law, it was clear that the old zoning boards had no original jurisdic-
tion and could only act on appeal from the act of a ministerial
officer. It is important to note that now, as then, the zoning board
has no original jurisdiction under these sections; the board can only
act on appeal after some definitive action by the zoning officer. 9
The MPC, however, in part, did away with this requirement in the
curative and challenge provisions. The zoning hearing board now
has original jurisdiction in the challenge type of case.
This procedural change has produced some confusion in that the
ordinary variance type of case has been improperly intermingled
with a "challenge." ' 0 The statutory requirements for a "challenge"
are expressly laid down in Sections 109101 and 1100522 and it would
be difficult to follow the mandates of those provisions and confuse
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10909 (1972).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (1972).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10913 (1972).
19. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Clairton, 390 Pa. 1, 133 A.2d 542 (1957).
20. Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 339 A.2d 612 (Pa. Comrnw. 1975).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972).
Vol. 14: 1
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the two types of cases. The ordinary variance situation is one in
which relief is sought from some requirement because the individual
property is unique in a particular respect. It subsumes that the
ordinance and the mapping process are quite valid. It is the unique
feature of the property itself which, for one reason or another, makes
it virtually impossible to use the property in the manner in which
the bulk or use requirements state it must be used. In a challenge
case, however, the broad aspects of the ordinance or mapping are
under attack as they apply to all of the properties subject to that
particular type of zoning."
III. THE NEW PROCEDURES: CHALLENGE AND CURATIVE
A. Challenge
As seen, Section 10910 provides that the board has original juris-
diction and that a landowner may challenge the validity of the
ordinance or map; a non-landowner may similarly challenge by rea-
son of the provision set forth in Section 11005. The statutory re-
quirements are explicit and should be rigidly adhered to.2
Procedurally, the landowner must direct a letter to the zoning
hearing board which contains the following:
1. A request for a learing. In this instance, it might be well to
frame the letter as a request for a hearing and mention the statutory
authority under which it is sought (Section 11004).25
2. The request for a hearing must contain a short statement
"reasonably" informing the board of the grounds for the challenge
and the matters in issue. Here it might be well to specify the sec-
tions of the ordinance or the map which impinge upon what the
landowner wishes to do, and why.
3. The challenge must be accompanied by plans "and other
material" describing the use or development which the landowner
proposes instead of that which is permitted by the ordinance or map
which he is challenging. Under the challenge section of the MPC,
the plans need not be highly detailed; in fact, something in the
nature of a sketch plan is usually sufficient. The plans need only
23. See Shuttle Dev. Corp. v. Township of Upper Dublin, 338 A.2d 777 (Pa. Commw.
1975), and cases cited therein.
24. Ralph W. Connelly, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 340 A.2d 597 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1972).
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reasonably inform the board of the use and bulk which the challeng-
ing party wishes to make of the land or building, and provide the
board with some basis for evaluating the challenge. The last
sentence in Section 11004(2)(c) 8 makes it clear that a landowner
could, should he so elect, draw quite a finite plan to an explicit level
of detail, obtain refusal from the zoning officer for that plan and
proceed on challenge to use that particular plan as his basis for
compliance with these requirements.
Because the orderly flow of legal business seldom follows the man-
ner in which statutes are drafted, the challenges (and curatives for
that matter) frequently provide the same information as indicated
above but not necessarily in the order outlined above.
The following is an outline for the aforementioned "challenge"
letter which, it is suggested, would meet all of the statutory require-
ments and nevertheless fit within the normative behavior of most
lawyers practicing in this field. The letter should be directed to the
zoning hearing board chairman, secretary and members, sent by
certified mail, return receipt requested, setting forth the following
facts:
(a) "Please be advised that this office represents Mr. X (or
the XYZ Corporation) who is (or which is) landowner as de-
fined by Section 10107(12) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code of certain lands situate or encompassed in the
following application.
(b) "Pursuant to the provisions of Section 11004 and Section
10910 of the Municipalities Planning Code, the landowner
challenges the validity of Sections __ and __ of the zoning
ordinance of the township/borough on grounds that the same
(here specify the grounds for the challenge as to the ordinance
or map)."
(c) The statement which is to inform the board of the grounds
for the challenge could well contain specifics such as:
"The present zoning ordinance makes no provision for multi-
family dwellings anywhere in the township, which is improper
as being exclusionary," or "the section of the zoning ordinance
which permits only condominiums in certain districts is void
since it is beyond the power of the local authorities to regulate
the manner of ownership.
26. The last sentence of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2)(c) (1972) reads: "Nothing
contained herein shall preclude the landowner from first seeking a final permit or approval
before submitting his challenge to the board or governing body."
Vol. 14: 1
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(d) "We enclose herewith plans and other materials which
describe the use to which the landowner wishes to put the land
in lieu of the use or development presently permitted by the
ordinance (here some description of the plan and other mate-
rial forwarded should be set forth which facilitates identifica-
tion of the enclosures)."
(e) This should be followed by a request for the hearing which
might take the following form:
"On behalf of the above-mentioned landowner, request is
hereby made for a hearing and a report thereon pursuant to the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code."
The purpose of these requirements becomes quite clear in light of
the express purpose of the MPC. The statement of the grounds for
challenge and the requirement for setting forth the matters in issue
allow the board and any other party in interest to determine the
nature of the case being brought and serve as a pleading. The plans
and other materials, of which more will be said later in the text
dealing with curatives, set the controversy in the context of a realis-
tic issue where alternatives can readily be ascertained. The plans
and other materials also set the stage for definitive relief in the
event that the landowner is successful. The plan itself and the de-
tails spelled out in the other materials can form the basis of a very
definitive order.
B. Curative
The curative amendment proceeding in Pennsylvania is one of the
two procedures that are available to a landowner to test the validity
of a general ordinance, any particular section thereof, or the map-
ping process.27 As in the challenge procedure, the requirements set
forth in the MPC2 must be followed meticulously. The failure to
comply with any one of them may result in dismissal. 9 The reason-
ing here seems to be consonant with the overall purpose which is to
allow a landowner to make a complaint to the local governing body
that something in the ordinance is substantively invalid and to give
27. Penn Township Bd. of Supervisors v. DeRose, 339 A.2d 859 (Pa. Commw. 1975); Robin
Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 386, 332 A.2d 841 (1975); Township of Neville
v. Exxon Corp., 14 Pa. Commw. 225, 322 A.2d 144 (1974).
28. The procedural requirements are established in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609.1
(1972).
29. Ralph W. Connelly, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 340 A.2d 597 (Pa. Conmw. 1975);
Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 339 A.2d 612 (Pa. Comnw. 1975).
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the governing body an opportunity to correct that substantive defi-
ciency. In order to set this in motion, the landowner must follow all
of the steps outlined above for a "challenge" and, additionally, must
submit a proposed form of amendment which would cure the alleged
defect. It is important to note, of course, that under Section 11004
the curative proceeding is addressed to the local governing body, not
to the zoning hearing board. Substantially the same format as that
outlined above in terms of a request should be made except that the
curative should be forwarded along with the other documentation.
Obviously, it should be sent to the local board of commissioners,
board of supervisors, or borough council. Once this is done, the
landowner has effectively served notice on the local governing body
that he believes its ordinance is defective and wants a hearing, a
determination, and definitive relief.
The filing of a curative amendment triggers an interesting shift
in the function of the local governing body under the MPC,
converting the local governing body into a quasi-judicial forum from
which an appeal will lie."0
The purpose of compelling this material and strict adherence to
the statutory requirements is, in reality, to allow the landowner to
put the local governing body on notice that he feels something is
grossly wrong and to give that body an opportunity to correct it. The
local governing body has the option of enacting the curative as
proposed, but it need not do so. That is, if the local authorities find
that there is merit to the allegation, they have the right not to enact
the suggested (curative) ordinance, but to cure using another ordi-
nance-provided it in fact cures.3' However, the local governing
body may not engage in retributory zoning and deprive the lan-
downer of definitive relief and the fruits of victory." The local gov-
erning body, having been converted into a quasi-judicial tribunal,
should hold a full administrative hearing closely following the re-
quirements set forth in Section 11004(2)(e) and (f).11 The hearings
30. Board of Commissioners v. Beho Dev. Co., 332 A.2d 848 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
31. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975); accord,
Appeal of Olson, 338 A.2d 748 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
32. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1974).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (2)(e), (f) (1972) provide:
(e) Notice of the hearing required by sections 609.1, 910, or 913.1, whichever is
applicable, shall include notice that the validity of the ordinance or map is in question
and shall give the place where and the times when a copy of the landowner's request,
including the plans submitted pursuant to subsection (2) (c) and the proposed amend-
Vol. 14: 1
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must be held within the time frame set out by the MPC and a
decision rendered within the time permitted by the MPC.
As a practical matter, the failure or unwillingness of the local
governing body to recognize that the ordinance or mapping is fatally
defective puts them at some risk. If they recognize the danger under
Ellick v. Board of Superisors,34 they may choose to cure the defect
by enacting either the curative amendment or an amendment other
than that which was proposed. In taking the latter course, they
maintain some degree of control provided that they do not pass one
which would be retributory under Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board. 5
They may not pass an ordinance which fails to give reasonable relief
nor may they enact an ordinance which imposes burdensome and
unreasonable conditions on the successful landowner. It behooves
municipalities to examine their ordinances carefully and to see that
they are in conformity with existing statutes and case law. If the
ordinance or mapping is in fact defective, the governing body acts
in its own best interest in granting the landowner some relief. If the
ments, if any, submitted under subsection (2) (d) may be examined by the public.
(f) The board or the governing body, as the case may be, shall hold a hearing upon
the landowner's request pursuant to sections 609.1, 910, or 913.1, whichever is applica-
ble, commencing not later than sixty days after the request is filed unless the
landowner requests or consents to an extension of time.
34. 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975). If the ordinance is defective, the municipal-
ity is exposed to being compelled to permit the challenging landowner to proceed in accord-
ance with his "plans and other materials." If the ordinance is shown to be improper "because
it totally prohibits the use proposed by the challenging landowner, then the governing body
must permit the challenging landowner to develop his land as proposed . 17 Pa.
Commw. at 411, 333 A.2d at 244 (emphasis added).
Note, however, that the local governing body does not lose its general "police power"
regulatory means, i.e., safety measures, sewage regulation, and reasonable building require-
ments, but insofar as overruling planning design, the governing body can lose its ability to
control use, bulk and location.
35. 328 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1974). The municipality may not cure the defect by passing an
ordinance which technically cures, but which leaves the challenger "out in the cold," i.e., by
rezoning others but not the challenger. The motive here might be to punish the challenger
for his effrontery and to discourage others from doing the same thing. Speaking of the term
"retributory zoning," the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted:
[T]he municipality could penalize the successful challenger by enacting an amenda-
tory ordinance designed to cure the constitutional infirmity, but also designed to zone
around the challenger. Faced with such an obstacle to relief, few would undertake the
time and expense necessary to have a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional.
328 A.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
The court went on to state that "an applicant, successful in having an ordinance declared
unconstitutional, should not be frustrated in his quest for relief by a retributory township."
Id. (emphasis added).
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municipality fails to do that and on appeal the court finds that the
landowner is correct, the court is obligated to determine then
whether the plan that he submitted is unreasonable and, if not, to
order its approval." In short, if the municipality for political or other
reasons refuses to recognize an essentially meritorious claim, it runs
the risk of having the landowner's plan forced upon it, whereas, if
it acts itself, it can still exercise a measure of control. It loses that
limited potential for control, however, once the proceedings on cura-
tive are closed, for a municipality cannot attempt to amend a gener-
ally defective ordinance after that time.37
The curative amendment procedure is a landowner-limited route
which is specifically procedurally circumscribed for the purpose of
allowing a landowner to give a municipality notice of a complaint
and of his intention to seek a hearing to correct a substantively
defective matter in the ordinance or the map. It should only be used
when the ordinance or map is virtually defective on its face. 8
On appeal from an action involving a curative amendment to the
court of common pleas, the court is no longer concerned with the
curative amendment itself, for that is no longer a viable issue.' 9 If
the court finds that the ordinance is, in fact, defective, its function
is then to determine whether or not the landowner's plan is "reason-
able" and which elements of the plan for the proposed development
should be approved so as to permit the landowner to proceed.40 It is
not the duty of the court to redesign or modify the plan, but merely
to pass upon the reasonableness of the proposal presented to it upon
that record.4 The court can refer (remand) elements of the plan to
the local governing body," but cannot refer the question of any
curative itself or the degree of relief to be granted. When such a plan
is referred or remanded, however, it should be accompanied by a
very specific court order delineating exactly what the local govern-
ing body is to find or do.43
36. Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 340 A.2d 909 (Pa. Commw. 1975);
Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
37. Kratz v. Skippack Township, 339 A.2d 595 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
38. See Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 386, 397-99, 332 A.2d 841,
848 (1975) (Crumlish, J., concurring).
39. Appeal of Olson, 338 A.2d 748 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
40. Id.
41. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (1972).
43. As to referral, see Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 339 A.2d 624 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
As to remand, see Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 340 A.2d 909 (Pa. Commw.
1975).
Vol. 14: 1
Municipalities Planning Code
It is highly unlikely that any significant litigation will develop
after the court has referred plans back to the local governing body;
the parties will have a tendency to work out an acceptable resolution
based upon the specifics of the court order. As a consequence, the
question of what is encompassed by a referral back to the local
agency may be subject to a good deal of confusion. It is generally
felt that the purpose of referring elements of the plan back to the
local governing body is to ensure that non-zoning conditions are met
in the plans. Since the MPC does not require detailed plans for
either a challenge or a curative, it could well be that such elements
as building code and fire code requirements, and water and sewage
connections, which are normally part of the process of obtaining
building permits, would not as yet have been complied with. It is
suggested that these are the items to which the MPC addresses itself
when it speaks of referring elements of the plan back to the local
governing body. Most of these are ministerial acts. Others are engi-
neering/architectural acts so nearly ministerial as to warrant classi-
fication as "quasi-ministerial."
Consequently, those items which deal with other than the broad
zoning aspects of the case should be referred to the local governing
body to see to it that compliance is achieved. The rationale for this
is perfectly obvious-the local governing bodies are accustomed to
processing such applications and the courts are not; the local gov-
erning bodies have the expertise to handle the matter, whereas the
courts do not.
Some confusion has arisen because of the tendency to use the
curative amendment procedure in lieu of the variance procedure.
The two are distinct and in fact, mutually exclusive. In establishing
these procedures as independent, the MPC merely acknowledged
the generally accepted notions of the separation of powers. The
distinction between the two is evidenced by the following:
(1) A variance case is heard by the zoning hearing board,
which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear requests for variances
and authority to grant relief under appropriate circumstances.
In a curative amendment, the hearing is held by the local
governing body, sitting specially as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
which has no such authority.
(2) If the local governing body were to pass a curative amend-
nent or grant definitive relief on a small parcel which does not
affect the overall scheme of zoning, it would approach "spe-
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cial" or "conditional" legislation which is constitutionally im-
permissible.
(3) The allegations in a variance case are totally different
from those in a curative case. In a variance case the validity
and constitutionality of the ordinance and map are assumed,
and it is asserted that there is some unique or peculiar hardship
to the property itself which makes it impossible to comply with
the regulations which are otherwise valid. In a curative pro-
ceeding the restrictions imposed by either the ordinance or the
mapping, either particularly or as a general scheme, are them-
selves attacked as being substantively invalid.
(4) In a curative case, unless the ordinance or mapping is
substantively defective, the local governing body has no power
to grant definitive relief, and it is the failure to grant definitive
relief that creates the cause or controversy which is appealed
and upon which the court acts. This cause or controversy is the
underlying bedrock of the court's jurisdiction.
Thus, as in many other fields of law, the questions of procedure
subtly blend into questions of substance. In this instance, this
blending is caused by the inextricable interlinkage which permeates
all of the procedural provisions of the MPC in its thrust for defini-
tive relief.
As a practical matter, this distinction seems to work out well.
Generally, a curative proceeding is short (or should be) because the
ordinance or mapping itself upon its face is under attack. This
usually takes but a short time to put on the record. Extensive rul-
ings with respect to the ordinance itself or the map are rarely re-
quired. After all, the ordinance is the ordinance and the official map
is the official map and the simple offer of both of them as physical
exhibits should suffice to make them a matter of record. Frequently
the local governing body takes much more time with the plans and
other materials than is necessary, although the issues are quite
sharply drawn. If the local governing body attempts to hold down
the propensity for speech making which frequently afflicts such
hearings, usually these cases can be completed in one evening. It is
rare that the local governing body needs to resort to the notes of
testimony to come to its decision, although it may wish to have
these for the filing of its formal findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Challenges, on the other hand, may take much more time and
tend to create a much longer record with many potential issues and
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so, perhaps, it is wiser to leave them to the zoning hearing boards.
The boards are, theoretically at least, more familiar with the hear-
ing, record-making and decision-making process than are governing
bodies. The challenge proceedings are more likely to be used where
there is a question of the net effect of the ordinance or mapping.
This would virtually mandate that there be much more of a record
and many more significant facts in contention.
Nevertheless, there is an area in which the procedures may well
overlap. One of the problems that can easily be foreseen is that there
will be many cases in which a portion of the facts, or all of the facts,
fit under one or more of the categories involved. In that instance,
the drawing of sharp lines between the various procedural routes
presents a counter-productive trend. It is easy to envision a series
of facts in which all three procedural avenues could be used for
varying aspects of the case. At some point, counsel will be compelled
to choose one of them. Confronted with the choice of whether to go
variance, challenge, or curative, it may be difficult to predict how
the courts will respond. One way to avoid this would be to apply the
normal rules with respect to such situations as obtain in equity.
Once one has obtained equity jurisdiction by reason of an acknowl-
edged equity head, the court in equity will take jurisdiction of the
entire matter and hear and decide all phases of the case to prevent
a circuity of actions. This would seem to be equally applicable in
cases arising under the MPC. Parties should not be forced to varying
procedures and different tribunals hearing different aspects of the
same case if for no other reason than that they might come to incon-
sistent results which would be legally supportable otherwise. The
only exception to this would be the confusion which might occur in
the variance versus curative procedures for the reasons previously
discussed.
IV. PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONVENTIONAL
SUBDIVISION CASES
Appeals by the landowner, from the grant or denial of conditions
imposed upon planned residential development" applications and
conventional subdivision controls, can go either to the zoning hear-
44. Hereinafter referenced as PRD. Planned residential development is governed by PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10701-10712 (1972).
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ing board or to the courts of common pleas at the option of the
landowner under Section 11006.11 The exception to this rule, as
stated in the MPC, only involves questions of interpretation of the
regulations, variances or special exceptions in which case the exclu-
sive remedy is to the zoning hearing board. 48 The possibility of this
arising in a PRD application or a conventional subdivision action
is quite remote. In the ordinary course of events, PRD applications
and their approvals, disapprovals or conditions are not likely to
involve variance, special exception or interpretation questions. The
same is true of conventional subdivision actions. Any other action
taken by either the governing body or the planning agency (or their
failure to act within the statutory period) could go on appeal di-
rectly to the court of common pleas for resolution or, at the option
of the landowner, to the zoning hearing board.
On the other hand, the non-landowner is treated quite differently.
Under Section 11007,11 any complaint by a person aggrieved, other
than a landowner, must first go to the zoning hearing board for
determination. 48 It might seem at first blush that it is markedly
unfair to treat the non-landowner and the landowner differently. As
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11006 (1972) provides in part:
(1) A landowner who desires to file a zoning application or to secure review or
correction of a decision or order of the governing body or of any officer or agency of
the municipality which prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in which
he has an interest on the grounds that such decision or order is not authorized by or is
contrary to the provisions of an ordinance or map shall proceed as follows:
(a) From a decision of the governing body or planning agency under a subdivision
or land development ordinance the landowner may appeal directly to court or to the
zoning hearing board under section 913.1 in cases where that section is applicable. If
the municipality provides a procedure, formal or informal, for the submission of pre-
liminary or tentative plans an adverse decision thereon shall, at the landowner's elec-
tion, be treated as final and appealable.
(b) From the decision of the governing body or planning agency denying tentative
approval of a development plan under section 709(3) or, if tentative approval has been
granted, from any adverse decision on an application for final approval, the landowner
may appeal directly to court or to the zoning hearing board under section 913.1 in cases
where that section is applicable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11006(1)(c), (d) (1972).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11007 (1972).
48. See Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 342 A.2d 450 (Pa. Commw. 1975); Northampton
Residents Ass'n v. Northampton Township Bd. of Supervisors, 14 Pa. Commw. 515, 322 A.2d
787 (1974); Cablevision-Division of Sammons Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
13 Pa. Commw. 232, 320 A.2d 388 (1974).
Who has standing in such cases and who is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
the MPC could well warrant a separate article.
Municipalities Planning Code
a matter of fact, this is not so. In general, the landowner has more
resources at his disposal and is seeking a conclusion of the contro-
versy along defined legal lines. A non-landowner, on the other hand,
generally has less enonomic resources and wants to obtain the ad-
vantage of some delay, if only to give himself an opportunity to
study the problem with which he is confronted. The procedures were
obviously designed to reduce the tendency toward litigation on the
part of both types of parties commonly involved in zoning cases. The
landowner-developer is not likely to go to court unless he is
reasonably sure of his position, but will gladly go if he has a legiti-
mate complaint. Comparatively, the non-landowner who is reluc-
tant to spend time and money defending a difficult or untenable
position will be able to obtain a sympathetic hearing before the
zoning hearing board without expending as much time or money.
Given the relative positions of the parties because of these proce-
dures, there is a built-in incentive to compromise along rational
lines.
One of the inequities of the pre-MPC law was that the non-
landowner, usually protesting some kind of use or development,
could profit enormously by delay and defeat legitimate proposals by
engaging in protracted appeals or by threatening to do so. This
practice was colloquially known as "sandbagging" and more legal-
istically described as keeping an applicant "in terrorem." Fre-
quently the local municipal officials covertly aided and abetted this
process, as by holding protracted zoning board hearings randomly
scheduled over several months and by delaying the decision for as
long as was humanly possible. After an appeal was filed, the local
authorities would seek continuances and would fail to have their
records in condition to be reviewed by the courts. This became such
a common practice that in many communities, it took upwards of
eighteen months to get a simple zoning decision to the argument list
in the court of common pleas. During this time the landowner
usually suffered substantial economic losses due to the necessity of
carrying the land and paying taxes and insurance while the land lay
unproductive. Thus, the protestant, or non-landowner, clearly prof-
ited by delay. The MPC seeks to discourage the "in terrorem" or
"sandbagging" tactics by including a special provision with respect
to appeals to the courts by a non-landowner who seeks to prevent
1975
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development on the land of another. Sections 1091611 and 11008(4)50
provide that a non-landowner who seeks to prevent such use or
development, whether he seeks a stay of proceedings by appealing
to court or not, may be required to post a bond as a condition to
proceeding with his appeal. This provision has been interpreted to
be a precondition to the right to continue an appeal and if it is not
met, the appeal can be dismissed,5' tending to reduce the number
of spurious appeals taken by non-landowners.
It is important to note that the bonding provision only comes into
effect after a non-landowner, or protestant, has taken an appeal
from the zoning hearing board. Certainly, at that stage of the pro-
ceeding he should have an excellent idea of whether or not he has a
clearly meritorious case. Should he have such a case, the bond will
not be as deterring at the time. Further, the landowner's rights to
demand such a bond of the non-landowner and the amount of the
bond are within the sound discretion of the court. In making such
determinations, the court will be influenced by the overview of the
case and will make an impartial appraisal of whether the non-
landowner has any reasonably legitimate cause for complaint. If his
complaint is well grounded the court could deny the right to a bond
altogether or set it at a minimal amount. On the other hand, if the
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916 (1972) provides in part:
When an application for development, preliminary or final, has been duly approved
and proceedings designed to reverse or limit the approval are filed with the board by
persons other than the applicant, the applicant may petition the court having jurisdic-
tion of zoning appeals to order such persons to post bond as a condition to continuing
the proceedings before the board. The question whether or not such petition should
be granted and the amount of the bond shall be within the sound discretion of the court
Id. (footnote omitted).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11008(4) (1972) provides:
The filing of an appeal in court under this section, shall not stay the action appealed
from but the appellants may petition the court having jurisdiction of zoning appeals
for a stay. If the appellants are persons who are seeking to prevent a use or development
of the land of another, whether or not a stay is sought by them, the landowner whose
use or development is in question may petition the court to order the appellants to post
bond as a condition to proceeding with the appeal. The question whether or not such
petition should be granted and the amount of the bond shall be within the sound
discretion of the court.
51. There are two separate provisions for bonds by non-landowners who appeal under
Sections 10916 and 11008(4). The first, Section 10916, deals with a bond when the appeal is
taken to the zoning hearing board, and the second, Section 11008(4), when the appeal is in
court. See, e.g., Hercek v. Whitehall Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 342 A.2d 127 (Pa.
Commw. 1975); Driscoll v. Plymouth Township, 13 Pa. Commw. 404, 320 A.2d 444 (1974);
Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Township, 3 Pa. Commw. 334, 281 A.2d 784 (1971).
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complaint is as one judge put it "picayune and insubstantial in
nature," and if the landowner's potential damages by delay may run
into large figures, the amount of the bond can be made quite high.
All in all, there is a rough-and-ready kind of justice about this.
These provisions are consistent with the entire tenor of the MPC
which is to define controversies, provide definitive relief, and create
situations whereby parties have equal bargaining power. All of this
tends to lead to very serious settlement negotiations, particularly
where building ordinances and mapping procedures have been used
for purposes not originally envisioned by the law.
V. NON-ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: MANDAMUS AND PROCEDURAL
APPEALS
The traditional right to mandamus has remained unchanged.
Obviously, a writ of mandamus will only be sought by someone who
has been denied the right to do something; this would make it
almost inevitably a landowner type of proceeding. The time-
honored qualifications upon that writ have not been significantly
altered by the MPC nor were they intended to be. A writ of manda-
mus will usually lie only where there is a clear right which has been
denied by a ministerial official." Section 1090913 of the Code ex-
pressly states that nothing contained in that section shall be con-
strued to deny the right to proceed to the court of common pleas for
relief in mandamus.
To the same extent, the pre-existing right to test the procedural
regularity of passage of an ordinance by going directly to court- is
preserved to both landowners and non-landowners, as provided for
in Section 11003. 51 The change from the pre-MPC law lies in the fact
that the action is now brought in the court of common pleas rather
than in quarter sessions and is raised by a zoning appeal rather than
a complaint. Inclusion of this provision in the MPC was also a
creature of experience. It was found that it was better to have the
questions of procedural regularity hammered out early if they were
52. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968); Lhormer v. Bowen,
410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963); Cohen v. Ford, 339 A.2d 175 (Pa. Commw. 1975).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10909 (1972).
54. Under pre-MPC law, by reason of the authority contained in the second class county
and first class township codes, there was a right to test the procedural regularity of a zoning
ordinance.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11003 (1972).
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to be assaulted and to go to court quickly for a determination. This
provision had worked well in pre-MPC days and was consequently
carried over.
The only substantial modification in this area has been by reason
of Northampton Residents Association v. Northampton Township
Board of Supervisors," which basically turned on the question of the
word "appeal" in Section 11003. In that case, the parties filing the
appeal to court were not those who had appeared at the township
hearings, and consequently were held not to be proper parties."
VI. CONCLUSION
The MPC consistently places an economic incentive in front of
those who would bring the zoning laws back to their original purpose
(to protect the public health, safety and welfare) and simultane-
ously discourages those who would use it for purposes of economic,
social or parochial discrimination. There is also a built-in incentive
for local governing bodies to zone and plan rationally; the risk of
having such actions overthrown at the landowner's initiative is al-
ways present. In contrast to the pre-MPC procedures which placed
a premium upon irrationality and resulted in a great deal of ad hoc
rezoning with the inevitable concomitant of both bad planning and
an incentive to delay final adjudication, many of the provisions of
the MPC have come as welcome relief. This is not to say that all is
completely well since the tendency toward strong home rule has
been effectively weakened by the MPC's enactment. A major tool
for home rule was the ability of the community to zone out that
which it did not want. If one takes the view that home rule is
necessarily always good, then of course, the MPC and its procedures
are very unwelcome. The consensus among most scholars and prac-
titioners in the field is that the pre-MPC law and procedures re-
sulted in excessive parochialism and that the MPC has redressed
the balance significantly.
The procedural aspects of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Plan-
ning Code came about as a result of experiences within the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania over the last half century. The proce-
dures differ for landowners and non-landowners in most instances.
56. 14 Pa. Commw. 515, 322 A.2d 787 (1974).
57. Id. at 520, 322 A.2d at 791.
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Landowners generally are given quicker access to the courts. Non-
landowners are largely relegated to their administrative remedy via
the zoning hearing boards if they are the parties initiating the ac-
tion. The thrust behind all of the procedures is to compel a rational
approach to zoning and mapping. The procedures give a clear incen-
tive to landowners to attack patently invalid ordinances and a con-
comitant disincentive to local government to enact such ordinances.
The procedures are designed not only to give ready access to the
courts and to set the framework of the controversy against a very
realistic and practical backdrop, but also to discourage litigation for
the sake of delay. The procedural aspects are very much in keeping
with the rest of the MPC in that the various contending forces
usually involved in the zoning drama are given roughly equal bar-
gaining chips and are thus encouraged to obey the law without going
to court. The penalty for taking a bad position and adhering to it
through a court proceeding may be substantial for any one of the
contending forces. This in itself encourages moderation, reasonable-
ness and obedience to the law. Despite the recent spate of litigation,
this will probably result in much better zoning and planning and
considerably less litigation in the long run.
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